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TiSA – a free trade area within the WTO – impact on healthcare, water, energy and 
municipal services 
 
This report was commissioned by PSI to raise awareness of PSI affiliates about the implications 
of Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) for healthcare, water, energy, and municipal sectors. 
 
The main research questions are: 
1. Which corporate players are involved in TISA negotiations through their networking 
and lobbying arrangements, highlighting companies involved in the four sectors;  
2. How will government (central, regional and local) actions to change and expand public 
services be influenced by TISA conditions in the four sectors; 
3. What are the implications of TISA for the process of re-municipalisation taking place in 
energy and water and potentially in health/social care? 
 
Geographical scope 
The research will focus specifically on the implications of TISA for the following countries: 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia,  Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, South 
Korea, Turkey, the United States, and the European Union, 
 
This report is in seven sections: 
1. Overview 
2. Lobbying 
3. Health 
4. Water 
5. Energy 
6. Municipal services 
7. Conclusion  
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1. Overview 
 
TiSA is the outcome  of talks that go back to early 2012 and a result of negotiations that began in 
early 2013 among  23 WTO members parties: Australia, Canada, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, European Union (representing its 28 Member States), Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, 
Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Republic 
of Korea, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. With the EU accounting for 28 member 
states, TiSA will include 50 WTO members who account for some 70% of all global trade in 
services.  More WTO members are planned to be included in the future and China 1 and Uruguay 
have voiced their interest in participating already. All current participants must agree to allow 
in new members; sources say some are still conducting their domestic processes in this area’.2  
The Agreement is an extension of the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
negotiations, which are part of the Doha Round negotiations, operating since 2000.  
Figure 1. TiSA negotiating parties map  
 
Key: TiSA negotiating parties are marked in blue.  
Source: Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 3 
 
TiSA is not simply an international trade agreement on trade in services separate from the rest 
of global trade architecture. It is a comprehensive rewriting and harmonisation of trade 
regulations of the EU, WTO, and beyond.   The European Commission (EC) explains that TiSA 
‘aims to liberalise trade in services among a diverse group of WTO members who are willing to 
push ahead with liberalisation faster than the general WTO membership’.   What is clear from 
the EC statement that ‘although the negotiations do not fall under the remit of the WTO, the EU 
is keen to ensure that the TiSA is carefully crafted to make it compatible with the GATS’.4 The 
fact that the negotiations are not being held within the WTO itself 5 generates suspicions as to 
the nature of the agreement, issues of transparency and democratic decision-making. Moreover, 
‘The EU – like the other participants – want negotiations to go beyond the opening up markets 
for services: the aim is also to develop new rules on trade in services.’ 6  
The European Commission (EC) seeks to expand the EU service market with a strong backing of 
EU service industry lobby and interest groups. 7  EU has multiple bi- and multilateral trade 
agreements within and outside the WTO framework but ‘there is also a group of countries with 
which either the EU has agreements where services commitments could be deepened (e.g. 
Mexico and Chile) or has no Free Trade Agreement (FTA) including a services chapter 
(Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Switzerland, Paraguay, Taiwan and Turkey)’. These countries 
make up some ‘22% of EU exports and more than 20% of EU imports of commercial services, 
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which amount to €123 and €90 billion Euros respectively’ and in case of the US, it is 32% of EU 
‘export and 34% of its imports of commercial services’ (EC 2013). 
 
TiSA, if adopted, ‘would have the effect of bringing about, for the first time, preferential binding 
commitments on services between the world's three largest services markets, namely the 
United States, the European Union, and Japan’. 8    This would benefit the exports of three 
economies, for example, U.S. exports are expected to increase by as much as $800 billion’.9   It is 
unclear how citizens, government, and consumers will  benefit from this growth in exports.  
However, TiSA is clearly designed to discriminate against the developing world and the Newly 
Industrialised Economies (NIEs) simultaneously by creating even more hierarchies within the 
WTO architecture. So, in their TiSA press release the EC declares:  
 
‘Unlike in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations, the possible future 
agreement would for the time being fall short of the participation of some of the leading 
emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India and the ASEAN countries. It is not 
desirable that all those countries would reap the benefits of the possible future 
agreement without in turn having to contribute to it and to be bound by its rules. 
Therefore, the automatic multi-lateralisation of the agreement based on the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) principle should be temporarily pushed back as long as there is 
no critical mass of WTO members joining the agreement’ (EC 2013: 3). 
 
This means that the EU and their ‘western’ partners are not interested in competition from 
Brazil, China, India and the ASEAN countries on terms beneficial to the latter group’s economies. 
Rather, the main present day exporters of services globally want to draw TiSA regulatory 
framework on their own terms to then structurally force all other WTO members and more to 
conform.  It can thus be assumed that the true reason behind TiSA being negotiated outside the 
WTO framework is that its advocates would like to create a forum that would only include those 
who are willing to go beyond the agreed WTO system from the very start. Integration of TiSA 
into WTO system after its finalisation and adoption essentially means exclusion of the non-TiSA 
signatories WTO members from WTO system renegotiation process.  
 
Not all countries negotiating TiSA are negotiating from an equal bargaining position. The main 
divisions within the cohort of TiSA negotiating countries should be drawn with caution and can 
go along a number of lines: high income countries, often the base of TNCs; economies with 
varying levels of regulations that cover labour, government spending, business, trade, financial, 
fiscal and investment services. 
  
The general public, as consumers and, in the first instance, producers of services, in countries 
with already weak regulation of labour, environment, government expenditure, investment and 
trade, will have the highest price to pay if TiSA is in place. Liberalisation of services without 
governmental control will brings environmental degradation, decline in quality of services 
supplied and increase in prices. Furthermore, liberalisation of trade in services increases risks 
the reduction of competition and is likely to lead to monopolisation and thus further reduce 
consumer choice and the bargaining power of workers and producers of services. Countries 
with stronger regulation will have to reduce or eliminate it to increase competition.  
There are several TiSA clauses which will affect the scope of countries to provide public services 
without exposing them to competition.  They affect countries not just in terms of their current 
position but also in the future.  They will limit the power of national governments to provide 
public services using new advances to meet the changing needs of the population.   
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Table 1: TiSA – basic clauses 
 
TiSA  clauses Meaning 
Standstill A ‘standstill’ clause means that members agree not to create 
new obstacles to services trade. 
Ratchet Only further liberalisation accepted.  A ‘ratchet-in’ clause, 
where one participating member improves services market 
access on its own, then the newly liberalised access would be 
given to other members in the agreement, and would become 
permanent.) 10 
List it or lose it Countries have to remember to list any sectors(s) that they 
would like to have exempted from the TiSA negotations.  If 
they forget to list a sector, it will automatically be included in 
the liberalisation process, there will not be any opportunities 
to reverse the negotiations.  
National treatment 
obligations 
National treatment obligations requires countries to ‘treat 
services and service suppliers of other parties no less 
favourably than the treat their own’.  This does not just apply 
to local private companies but also to government, not for 
profits and cooperatives providers.  
Domestic regulations Regulations will not have to be discriminatory to be 
challenged.  Regulations that limit the scope of the commercial 
sector to expand, for example limiting opening hours, 
preservation of historical sites or green spaces.  
Necessity test This applies to challenges to government regulations, 
especially over public services, on the grounds of whether they 
are ‘necessary’.  
Future proofing Limit the right to regulate for future (public) services, even 
when these future services have not yet been invented.  
Governments would not be able to ban future services, e.g. 
new types of gambling. 
 
Standstill and ratchet provision 
The basic TiSA clauses set out in Table 1 show the extent of the potential influence of TiSA on 
public services and governmental actions.  Two TiSA clauses will be particularly threatening.  
The first ‘standstill provision’ will bind members so that they are unable to restrict 
liberalisation of services.   The second  ‘ratchet provision’  requires that “any changes or 
amendments to a domestic services-related measure that currently does not conform to the 
agreement's obligations (market access, national treatment, most favored nation treatment) be 
made in the direction of greater conformity with the agreement, not less’. 11 Thus, it will not be 
possible to reverse this liberalisation of the market.   Such rigidity and irreversibility are 
particularly damaging in the light of the multiple cases of inefficiency, poor quality of services, 
and increasing costs that often result from liberalisation.  
 
Negative list approach/ ‘list it or lose it’ 
The most recent round of negotiations to date was held in Geneva on 28 April-2 May 2014. A US 
Trade Department press release reported that upon the completion of the Geneva round of 
negotiations in 2013, ‘the draft text of the agreement was further stabilized with the removal of 
all brackets concerning the “negative list” approach’.12 This was a provision that allowed 
countries involved in GATS negotiations to exclude certain sectors, such as health and 
education.  In the current TiSA negotiations, this provision is being replaced with a ‘list it or lose 
it’ approach, where national treatment applies to all market actors unless a country applies for a 
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special exemption ahead of signing. If a country fails to apply for exemption, there is no way of 
changing the position. 
 
According to the Global Services Coalition (GSC), the timetable for the negotiations completion 
should aim for 2015. For that ambitious timetable to be achieved:  
 
‘This will require continued determination to tackle the difficult issues early, so that the 
most exacting questions facing negotiators do not get left too late. Among such questions 
are “21st century issues” including cross border data flows, regulatory transparency and 
coherence, movement of business persons, global value chains, and rules for state-owned 
and state-sponsored enterprises that compete in commercial markets’.13 
This means the unrestricted movement of businesses, company directors and business 
consultants and the opening of state-owned and state-sponsored services to privatisation 
without a right to re-nationalisation or re-municipalisation.  
Regulations 
TiSA will have a significant impact on the power of governments to impose regulations and 
standards related to ‘food safety, toxic chemicals, occupational health, and the protection of the 
environment’.  These will include regulation of public subsidies, which will be subject to 
corporate policy decisions with no public accountability or public control.14   
 
2. TiSA, TNCs, and Lobbying  
 
Trade liberalisation discourse is not new. It is something that Trans-national Corporations 
(TNCs) directly, via lobbying, and indirectly, via International Finance Institutions (IFIs), have 
been pursuing for several decades.  The main EU, US, and global business lobbies and their own 
governments all strongly support TiSA and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TT IP).15 The two treaties in combination, if in force, will provide a comprehensive 
international legal framework that would allow almost unrestricted access to, not only trade in 
public services but also decisions on how those services are provided and the impact of 
regulations on service quality.  
 
Both the US and EU governments and other governments promote TISA and TTIP.  They 
communicate with businesses directly and via lobbies and also open the matter to public 
consultation after consulting businesses and their associations. So, a public consultation on TiSA 
in the EU was  completed by 6 September 2013.16 There were 40 responses in total, out of which 
26 came from businesses and the rest from NGOs and other stakeholders. Opinions of the 
former were mixed, whereas the latter were clearly critical of TiSA generally and of the national 
treatment, standstill and ratchet clauses in particular.17  
 
International businesses and their organisations were additionally and independently consulted 
on the content of TiSA and TTIP too.  The  American Chamber of Commerce (ACC), 
Confederations of British, Swedish, German Industry, Transnational Business Council, Business 
Coalition on Transatlantic Trade, European Services Forum (ESF), BUSINESSEUROPE, DHL, UPS, 
European Express Association, BT, and Lilly are some of the most prominent stakeholders who 
had meetings with the EU/EC between 1 Jan 2012 and 19 Apr 2013. 18 As an example of how 
decisions are being made away from the main stakeholders, the future of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs)19 was discussed with the US Chamber of Commerce (Meeting #73) rather 
than with the SOEs themselves or their representative unions.  
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One crucial point is that the liberalisation of trade in services and beyond will benefit primarily 
a few TNCs, which are already out-competing the rest.  They also  have a  strong negative record 
of operating globally, which includes  job losses, tax avoidance, economic inefficiency, poor 
quality of services/good supplied combined with increasing costs. Considering the potential 
implications of liberalisation of trade generally and privatisation of public services particularly 
it is important to understand which companies stand behind TiSA and TTIP promotion as they 
will be the highest bidders when the treaties are in force.  
 
Tax evasion 
Many of the largest global private service suppliers have been accused for tax evasion. For 
example, GDF Suez (Energy and Water), EDF (Energy), Veolia (Water), IMB (Hardware and 
Software), Eni (Energy), Shell (oil and gas), BP (energy), Glencore (mining) have all been 
reported to have used Dutch registration to avoid and evade paying tax elsewhere in the EU, US, 
and more.  A report by tax campaign group ‘Publish What You Pay Norway’ found that more 
than a third of the 6,038 subsidiaries owned by major energy and mining companies are ‘based 
in jurisdictions where accounts and ownership details are publicly unobtainable’.20 Moreover, 
‘among the 358 Netherlands subsidiaries belonging to the world's most powerful extractive 
industry companies are subsidiaries whose names suggest their physical assets are held in a 
country which is not the Netherlands’.   
 
The removal of restrictions on trade in services embedded in TiSA will result in an even higher 
degree of tax evasion by making it easier for TNCs to engage in transfer pricing, the process that 
TNCs use to establish prices of good which are traded between subsidiaries, more often a form 
of mis-pricing, which reduces the taxes that TNCs are required to pay national governments. 
This will reduce national government revenues, so limiting the power of governments to either 
avoid austerity policies or continue to support public services.  Countries, such as  Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, and Turkey , which have weak 
financial, business and trade regulations and high levels of government corruption, coupled 
with a higher degree of services market liberalisation, will suffer most and more rapidly.  In the 
EU the impact will be member state specific.  
 
Mapping of lobby membership 
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Figure 2. Interlocking TNCs membership in business lobby group advocating TiSA (and TTIP) 
 
 
Key  
squares – lobby groups  
circles – TNCs 
circles connected to more than one 
square - interlinking lobby 
membership. 
Lobby groups 
ERT  - European Round Table of Industrialists 
CSI –Coalition of Services Industries 
ACC American Chambers of Commerce 
ESF – European Services Forum 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the mapping of company membership in lobby groups that advocate for 
TiSA and TTIP and generally work closely with negotiating countries’ governments. Figure 2 
shows companies that are members of more than one lobby simultaneously and thus seek to 
impact governments’ decision-making via more than one medium. Figure 3 is a mapping of all 
member companies in the lobbies from energy, water, healthcare, and telecommunication and 
postal services.  These are sectors that are most likely to be subject to privatisation and thus 
loss of public control. The companies listed have been linked to inefficient, costly, and consumer 
and environmentally damaging operations, which will be discussed later, and are all part of the 
lobby-company network visualised below.  
 
A seemingly weak link of services industry lobbies with European Round Table of Industrialists 
(ERT) on the company level is explained by the sectoral composition of ERT members as well as 
regional specificities of their business operation. Lack of interlocking members between ERT 
and American Chambers of Commerce (ACC) is explained by differences in the region of 
corporate domicile – EU and US respectively – of their member companies. Both ERT and ACC 
group voiced strong support in respect of TiSA and TTIP. US companies are dominant in the 
network around ACC and CSI. Limited interlinking between US (ACC and SCI), and EU (ERT and 
ESF) lobbies is not surprising as the regions and companies are in competition with each other.  
However this does not undermine their similar trade liberalisation vision within TiSA and TTIP 
frameworks.  Also, only companies with presence in US and EU respectively are allowed to 
become members of the respective lobby groups.  
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Table 2 shows companies in energy, water, healthcare, telecommunication and postal sectors 
which are members of business lobby group which are advocating TiSA (and TTIP). These 
sectors that will be opened up for privatisation under the frameworks of the two agreements, 
unless they are already privatised.   
 
Table 2: Energy, Water, Healthcare, Telecommunication and Postal services TNCs-
members of business lobby group advocating TiSA (and TTIP) 
 
Sector  Water Energy  Healthcare  Telecommunications 
and Post  
Companies 
  
 
Foley 
Nestle  
Veolia 
Environmental 
 
AES 
BP 
Chevron 
CIR 
Eni 
ExxonMobil 
FirstSolar 
GE 
Iberdrola 
MOL 
NorskHydro 
Repsol 
RioTinto 
RoyalDutchShell 
TOTAL 
CIR 
EliLilly 
F. Hoffmann-La 
Roche 
MSD 
AT&T 
BT 
Deutsche Post DHL 
Deutsche Telecom 
Deutsche Telecom AG 
FEDEX 
France Telecom 
PostEurope 
Sky 
Telefónica 
Telenor Group 
UPS 
Verizon 
Vodafone  
Vodafone Group 
GDF Suez 
 DuPont 
Sabanci Holding  
  
 
 
Figure 3 shows  the listed companies in the four lobby groups, which are promoting TiSA and 
TTIP. Also included is EPPA PR , a company that works to ‘build bridges between the European 
public interest and private interests’ i.e. specialise on bringing governments and businesses 
together and thus represents a crucial link between the two. 
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Figure 3. Energy, Water, Healthcare, Telecommunication and Postal services TNCs 
membership in business lobby group advocating TiSA (and TTIP) 
 
 
 
 
 
Key 
Blue squares – lobby groups;  
Circles – TNCs;  
Circles connected to more than one square – 
interlocks in lobby membership.  
 
 
Key: Colour economic sector  
Yellow – telecommunications and postal 
services;  
Lime green – energy;  
Red – healthcare services;  
Teal – water;  
Dark green – TNCs involved in more than one 
sector simultaneously (see Table 1 for 
details);  
Fuchsia – BusinessEurope EU industry 
lobbies; and  
Black – business+government US PR firm, 
EPPA. 
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The following sections will outline the potential impact of TiSA on the healthcare, water, energy 
and municipal services sectors.  Each analysis will start with an account of how the main clauses 
of TiSA could affect each sector followed by some examples of how liberalisation has impacted 
on these sectors in the last few years.  The countries selected are TiSA negotiating countries and 
some other WTO member states that underwent reforms similar to those proposed in TiSA but 
within the framework of GATS and domestic neoliberal policies. These examples show the costs 
of trade liberalisation in these sectors. The effects of trade liberalisation in healthcare, water, 
and energy are not limited to those sectors but extend throughout the services supply chains.  
 
3. Health/social care 
 
There is a growing body of evidence to show that publicly funded and managed healthcare 
systems provide universal health services more effectively and efficiently than private 
providers.  Appendix A shows the provision of healthcare services, cost and efficiency in 
Australia, Canada, Chile, France, Peru, South Korea, UK and the US.  The table shows that private 
ownership of health care systems leads to poorer service quality and reduced efficiency, higher 
costs and reduced employment of qualified healthcare professionals (Appendix A).  Public 
healthcare services will be affected by TiSA in several ways. 
 
Standstill and ratchet clauses 
Governments will be unable to impose new regulations on health services once they sign TiSA 
because they will be committed to maintaining existing levels of liberalisation. If one 
government changes its policies in favour of a more liberalised approach after signing TiSA, 
then other countries in TiSA will be bound automatically in favour of the greater degree of 
liberalisation.  Newly elected governments will only be able to increase the degree of 
liberalisation and will be unable to decrease the level of liberalisation.  This would make it 
impossible for privatised hospitals or failed private hospitals to be returned to public 
ownership.  It would make it impossible for a country to introduce more extended rights to 
health care by limiting provision to certain providers.   
 
Chile introduced extensive privatisation of the healthcare system in the 1970s and has 
experienced some of the problems generated by a rapid expansion of the private sector, with 
resources being taken away from the public sector.  Key healthcare indicators, such as total 
health spending as a % of GDP and numbers of nurses and doctors per 1000 population, show 
that Chile is well below the average for OECD countries.    
 
Table 3: Chile healthcare data 
 Chile OECD 
Total health spending % GDP 7.5 9.3 
Health spending  per capita $1568 $3339 
Health spending – public 
sources 
46.9% 72.7% 
Physicians per 1000 
population 
1.6  3.2 
Nurses per 1000 population 1.5 8.7 
Hospital beds/1000 
population 
2.2 4.8 
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Source: OECD   
 
Chile is already experiencing the problems of global trade agreements.  People have limited 
access to high-tech diagnostic and therapeutic equipment because of their high costs, foreign 
production, and the restrictions on cheaper reproduction under the TRIPS WTO agreement.  
 
In 2008, 68% of the population was covered by a public healthcare fund, 18% by private 
companies, and 14% by other ‘not-for-profit agencies or did not have any specific coverage.  The 
limited access that people had to basic treatments made the Chilean government introduce 
major reforms in health care provision in 2005, called the Universal Access with Explicit 
Guarantees (AUGE) system, which provided people with access to a basic list of health care 
treatments, without having to incur high costs of treatment.  The AUGE reform led to an 
increase in the treatment of chronic conditions by the two major insurers.  Diagnosis of major 
conditions has improved leading to faster treatment. 21 
 
The AUGE reform has been accompanied by a sizable increase in total health spending in 
the country, both from public and private sources. Total real health spending per capita 
grew by 155 percent, from Ch$283,000 (US$542) to Ch$721,000 (US$1,384), although it 
has stabilized as a share of gross domestic product at around 7.5 percent. Out-of-pocket 
health spending has dropped by 10% of the share of health financing in the country, 
from nearly 50 percent in 2000 to about 38 percent in 2011’.22 
 
The AUGE reforms would have been impossible to introduce under TiSA. The power of 
governments to introduce new universal provisions, which affect competition within the 
national system, would be outlawed by the ‘standstill and ratchet’ clauses, which only allow for  
increased competition.  A government would not be able to limit international private 
healthcare providers from entering the national healthcare system. 
 
This constant requirement to increase liberalisation, would also affect public health measures.  
Governments use the regulation of the sale of tobacco and alcohol to limit consumption, by 
imposing taxes.  If a government was to liberalise these measures, as the current Norwegian 
government is currently considering, then a future government would not be able to impose 
new regulations.  This has serious implications for the democratic process because political 
parties would not be able to introduce measures supporting universal health services and the 
promotion of public health.   
 
Future proofing 
The healthcare sector could be potentially affected by the ‘future proofing’ clause, which 
requires the liberalisation of new services which may develop over time.  In a sector where 
high-tech interventions are being developed to screen, diagnose and treat forms of cancer and 
other non-communicable diseases, this clause would limit the power of national governments to 
extend the universal provision of health services, through taxation.  The scope of public health 
care services would not be allowed to grow in the light of technological innovations or even 
interventions which demonstrate increased effectiveness.  Similarly advances in the delivery of 
social care would be subject to the same limits, with universal provision of social care being 
outlawed.  This would be particularly strong in countries where there has been an expansion of 
private provision, in some cases through privatisation of public services.  TNCs would argue that 
any new types of services should be subject to trading and competition.  Governments would be 
unable to safeguard the long term public interest.  
 
National treatment obligation 
National treatment obligations would require countries to ‘treat services and service suppliers 
of other countries no less favourably than they would treat their own’.  In the context of the 
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healthcare sector, this would involve local health providers – government, non-governmental 
and cooperatives - which often play an important role in the provision of health and social care.    
The advantages of locally run services would be overtaken by TNCs.  The experience of the 
social care sector in the UK shows some of the disadvantages of social care services delivered by 
companies which have headquarters and investors far away from the places in which care 
services care delivered.  It results in decisions being made which do not meet the needs of local 
people and the people receiving care. 
 
Domestic regulation/ Necessity test 
It is in the area of regulation, which could affect the health and social care sectors most strongly.  
Public health depends on regulations in relation to environmental health, food, housing and 
land use planning as well as regulations of health care provision and health care professionals.  
 
The power of governments to regulate in these areas could be subject to challenge by private 
companies, who could bring cases to trade dispute panels.  The AUGE reforms of Chile would 
also have been subject to challenge by private insurance providers.23  Gould (2014) argues that 
there would be implications for the Affordable Care Act in the United States because countries 
would have had to commit health insurance services to TiSA. The introduction of affordable care 
through a health insurance scheme, which would make treatments accessible at a low cost, 
would be challenged by the health insurance providers on the basis of the ‘necessity test’.  They 
might suggest alternative ways of providing these healthcare benefits, which would be ‘less 
burdensome to business’. 24 
 
The quality of health services is strongly influenced by systems of healthcare regulation which 
set out minimum standards of care.  One provision of TiSA is an attack on domestic regulation, 
which would affect the licensing of health facilities and laboratories.  This would allow private 
sector providers to operate with minimum quality standards.  Already, medical laboratory 
services are considered a potential area of investment for healthcare companies, for example   
Fresenius. 
 
The free movement of labour is an important element of free trade agreements.  In health and 
social care there is already extensive global movement of workers, often moving from low to 
higher income countries, leaving low income countries with shortages of health workers.  
Migrant health workers entering the privatised social care system often work in poor conditions 
with low pay.  TiSA restrictions on government regulation would limit the power of 
governments to set minimum wage levels and terms of conditions and to regulate rights of 
migrant workers.  
 
The restrictions on government regulations will affect the recruitment of health professionals 
with recognised qualifications.  TNCs entering the healthcare market may choose to bring their 
own health professionals who are not necessarily registered to work in a particular country and 
who may be paid on lower salary levels to nationally qualified and registered health 
professionals.  This will impact on the quality of care provided.   
 
TiSA might affect data privacy of personal medical records, stored in electronic form.   Several 
Canadian provinces require electronic medical records to be kept within their jurisdiction.  If  a 
US company took over the contract to manage medical records then the company would be 
required by the US Patriot Act to disclose information.  This would enable US government 
agencies and private companies to access personal medical information.25   
 
The systems of accreditation for medical schools and professional education centres for health 
care workers could be challenged by private providers.  Already higher education is becoming 
privatised, with private, for profit providers entering the market.  If domestic regulations were 
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challenged on the basis that they hindered liberalisation of the ‘education market’, this could 
result in a wide range of medical and health training providers creating training courses which 
did not adhere to well-established national professional regulations.  This would lead to the 
over-production of doctors and other health workers and the fall in the standards of healthcare 
provision.  Chile, and several other Latin American countries have experienced the expansion of 
professional medical training from the private sector, which led to over-production of doctors.  
26 
 
Limited domestic regulation would also restrict the ability of governments to regulate the rights 
and working conditions for health care and social care workers.  The expansion of home health 
and medical care places health and social care workers in highly individualised environments, 
which make it difficult to monitor health and safety legislation and other forms of worker 
protection of workers. 
 
An example of how telemedicine has been introduced in South Korea, highlights the problems of 
a liberalised healthcare system.  In December 2013 some 10,000 to 20,000 doctors 
demonstrated against telemedicine. The latter ‘refers to the use of information-communication 
technologies for the delivery of clinical care’ and is advocated as a scheme that can ‘help people 
consult with and get prescriptions from doctors without having to travel to hospitals’.  South 
Korea is the only country in the world where telemedicine is banned by law. According to the 
Ministry’s plan to start in 2015:  
 
‘the service will be restrictively permitted to patients who require regular and a long-
term medical checkup but are not in critical condition. The list of patients eligible for the 
telemedicine service includes those diagnosed with hypertension, diabetes and mental 
disorders. Patients who had surgery but were discharged from hospital will also be 
included for follow-up examination’. 27 
 
The Korean Medical Association, a lobby group for physicians, strongly opposed the ministry’s 
decision, saying it would damage medical services by allowing an examination of a ‘patient 
without a face-to-face consultation would undermine the fundamentals of medical service’. 28  In 
addition, KMA is concerned that telemedicine ‘would further drive patients toward large 
hospitals in Seoul, leaving local clinics behind’. The ministry responded with allowing ‘only 
primary care providers such as doctors at local clinics to practice telemedicine’. This 
arrangement will be threatened if TiSA is in force as restrictive.  
 
The telemedicine bill was approved on March 25, 2014 at a Cabinet meeting chaired by Prime 
Minister Chung Hong-won, and has been sent to the National Assembly for passage. Now the 
door is opening ‘to telehealth and mHealth in South Korea [that] presents exceptional business 
opportunities to the health care industry, particularly manufacturers and suppliers of telehealth 
technologies’.  People’s health and the quality and costs of healthcare will be controlled by TNCs, 
which under TiSA will have equal access to Korea’s market with national companies. The reform 
also raises concerns about the privacy of patients’ health records, potential data loss and 
erroneous diagnoses with potentially debilitating and even lethal consequences. 
 
The approval of the telemedicine bill in Such South Korea questions the future quality of public 
healthcare. For example, studies of telehealth introduction in the UK showed it to be to be not 
cost-effective. In a large ‘randomised controlled trial which examined the costs of a range of 
telehealth services and their effect on the quality of life in patients with heart failure, diabetes, 
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)’ showed that ‘adding telehealth to standard 
care increased costs by about 10% (including costs of the intervention and additional 
healthcare services) for only a very minimal gain in quality of life’. 29 Global revenue for 
telehealth devices and services is expected to increase to $4.5 billion in 2018, up from $440.6 
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million in 2013 based on data from an IHS report. 30  Moreover, ‘global telehealth market is 
expected to grow by more than a factor of 10 from 2013 to 2018, as medical providers 
increasingly employ remote communications and monitoring technology to reduce costs and 
improve the quality of care ‘. There is no evidence that there are any savings or quality 
improvement. 
 
4. Water 
 
Standstill and ratchet clauses 
Public water services would be affected by TiSA in several ways.  The most important influence 
of TiSA on the water sector is that it would make the current movement for re-municipalisation 
of water resources illegal.31  The pace of re-municipalisation has doubled since  2009 because of 
three factors: ‘widespread problems affecting water privatisation irrespective of country and 
regulatory regime; the equal or greater efficiency of public water services, and the lower prices 
resulting from elimination of excessive profits; and, the comparative advantage of the public 
sector in realising the human right to water and sanitation and achieving other social and 
environmental objectives’. 32  Water services have been re-municipalised in high, medium and 
low income countries.  The reasons why water services have been returned to public 
management show the failure of the TNC sector to contribute to the public goal of universal 
access to clean and affordable water. The rhetoric of private sector financing is a myth. There is 
no commitment to universal access to clean and affordable water unless significant profit can be 
guaranteed. These profit ratios have not been quickly, nor easily forthcoming in the developing 
world. The claim that the water TNC will save government money by providing more efficient 
and cost-effective operation, maintenance and rehabilitation of water and sanitation services is 
also not borne out in practice. 
 
Both the ‘standstill’ clause which states that countries cannot agree to any new obstacles to 
liberalisations of services and the ‘ratchet’ clause which only accepts further levels of 
liberalisation, would make the taking back control of public water resources contrary to the 
increased liberalisation that TiSA  sets out.   There are many examples of how re-
municipalisation has saved money and improved the quality of water, for example, Paris, 
Berlin,La Paz, Buenos Aires, Atlanta.33  Smaller towns such as Cave Creek, in the US  ‘saved 
money and improved service after bringing its water and wastewater treatment systems into 
public hands, exiting and not renewing deals with Arizona American Water’. 34  Newly elected 
governments would only be able to increase the degree of liberalisation and would be unable to 
decrease the level of liberalisation.  This has serious implications for the democratic process and 
the aim of electing parties committed to improving public services and making universal 
services available.   
 
The case of Argentina illustrates how TNCs respond when their contracts are terminated by 
governments.  After 1993, TNCs were granted expensive contacts for water and sanitation 
services which proved to be inefficient and costly. In the case of Aguas Argentinas services 
improved but neither the targets for investment nor for quality were met.   Ducci (2007) 
documented that ‘the water regulator ETOSS estimated that between 1993 and 2002 Aguas 
Argentinas delivered only 61% of the total investment due’. 35  The underinvestment, saved the 
company US$746.4 million between 1993 and 1998 alone. 36  In addition, Azurix, the water 
division of the Enron Corporation, was given exclusive rights to provide water and sanitation 
services to the province of Buenos Aires for 30 years. Their operation resulted in a price 
increase and drop in quality of water so severe that consumers had to boil it before drinking.  37 
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In Argentina, the renationalisation and remunicipalisation of water in Santa Fe, Tucuman, 
Buenos Aires, and its province  re-established a strong role for central government in the sector, 
which was the case before the privatisations were introduced between 1993 and 2006.  38  
However, the government decision to terminate the contract came at high price as, following re-
municipalisation, Azurix sued the Argentine government citing a US-Argentina bi-lateral 
investment agreement which gave investors ‘security and protection’. Consequently Azurix  
was awarded $165.2 million (£99 million) of compensation by the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes in 2006.39 
 
The ‘ratchet’ clause would also impact on the growing conflicts over water as a resource in 
many areas of the world.  The term ‘water grabbing’ has become increasingly common because 
the ‘mechanisms for appropriating and converting water resources into private goods are much 
more advanced and increasingly globalised, subject to international laws on foreign investment 
and trade’.  40  Water is now considered a commodity, which means access to it is mediated by 
money, not the need to survive.  Water grabbing is the ‘direct extraction of water for the 
production of food, fuel and crops’. But is it also involves ‘water infrastructure such as dams, 
reservoirs, hydropower stations, canals, and irrigation systems which divert and deplete water 
sources, potentially affecting entire river basins’. 41  As more of these resources move into TNC 
control, the less control communities will have over water resources, water quality and water 
prices, which will lead to increased prices, environmental degradation and pollution, and a fall 
in the quality of water supplied. 
 
The company, America Water, is an example of how companies focus on buying up water and 
sewage systems.  America Water targets struggling municipal systems, buy other private 
systems near to the existing network and then increases water and sewage rates.  In 2012, 
America Water bought 10 water and sewer systems and increased water rates in nine states but 
it also sold its systems in Arizona, New Mexico and Ohio to concentrate on states expected to be 
more profitable.42 At the same time, the company ‘cut labour costs by $17.8 million, or 3.6 
percent, most of which came out of employee pensions’.43  
 
National treatment obligation - ‘list it or lose it’ 
In GATS/ WTO negotiations, countries could choose whether to open sectors to competition, 
which was known as the ‘positive listing’ structure which enabled countries to choose not to 
include the water sector.  TiSA has adopted the ‘negative listing’ approach, whereby countries 
have to choose the exclude a sector from competition.  It will be very important for countries 
involved in TiSA negotiations to list the water sector as exempt from liberalisation.  If countries 
forget to list the water sector, they will be unable to protect the sector from liberalisation. 
 
Domestic regulation/ Necessity test 
The quality of water services is strongly influenced by national/regional/local agreements,  
which set out minimum standards of water quality and other aspects of water provision.  The 
‘domestic regulation’ and ‘necessity test’ clauses are an attack on domestic regulation, which 
wants to reduce the influence of regulation on basic public services.   This has serious 
implications for the water sector. Governments at all levels play an important role in the 
monitoring and regulating the quality of water.  TiSA may prevent governments from playing 
this role in protecting water quality because TNCs will ask if the regulation is necessary.   
 
Food and Water Watch have repeatedly reported that the ‘process of privatizing water systems 
is complicated, expensive and time consuming, and the cost of monitoring a private water 
operator’s performance can be substantial’. 44 Under TiSA, in combination with TTIP,  such 
monitoring will become not only more expensive but also redundant as any attempt to penalise 
a company could be interpreted as a move to jeopardise future revenue and/or investment, 
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which would make the government liable for those incurred losses.  The implications of 
reducing regulation of water resources will affect health and the environment.   
 
There are many countries that illustrate some of the problems that occur when water 
regulations are either ignored or not implemented.   For example, although the United States 
has extensive environmental regulation, regulatory agencies often allow agribusiness 
companies to ignore it.  This results in the misuse of water resources and breach of sanitation 
regulations by private companies in the extraction, manufacturing, and agricultural sectors.  45 
In a sample of wells surveyed by the US Geological Survey from 1993 to 2000, 2 percent of 
public-supply and 9 percent of the domestic wells more common in rural areas were found to 
have nitrate concentrations higher than the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s 
maximum allowable level. The EPA estimates that about 1.3 million households in counties with 
industrial livestock facilities get their water from wells with dangerously high nitrate levels’. 46 
 
Limiting the scope of government to regulate will affect water service workers because setting  
minimum standards for pay, terms and conditions as well as regulating the rights and 
conditions for migrant workers will be illegal, because it will be considered limiting the right of 
TNCs to do business and make profits.  It will also prohibit the use of labour market surveys to 
determine if there are local workers available to do the work. 
 
5. Energy 
 
Standstill and ratchet 
As in the case of the water sector, the TiSA standstill and ratchet clauses will affect the power of 
governments at local, regional and national levels to take back energy production into public 
hands, under democratic control.  In Germany, the public is now critical of energy privatisation 
as the prices have risen sharply, resulting in growing support for (re-)municipalisation (EPSU 
2011).  Between 2007 and 2011 ‘44 new local public utilities (Stadtwerke) have been set up and 
more than 100 private concession contracts for energy distribution networks and service 
delivery have returned to public hands’. In January 2014,  in the City of Hamburg, the Swedish 
energy company, Vattenfall, agreed to sell its 74.9% share in electricity grid to the city following 
a referendum on re-municipalisation of the distribution grids for electricity, gas, and district 
heating held in September 2013. Vattenfall also co-owns the district heating network with the 
city, 74.9% and 25.1% respectively and is offering the city to buy its share in 2019. 47  
 
Energy companies are selling entire networks back to the government. ‘Almost all existing 
contracts in the energy sector are up for renewal in the period up to 2016’ and 2/3 of 
communes plan to buy back their energy networks. 48 That will come under threat with TiSA, as 
municipalities will have to compete against energy TNCs in bidding for energy networks. Also, 
private energy companies are not leaving the market but are just selling the network to help 
finance their debts. This means that once liberalised under TiSA, services quality is likely to 
drop and cost to rise even more. 
 
National treatment obligations 
The global energy market is by far one of the most lucrative and thus both competitive and 
monopolised at the same time. De Graaf (2012) studied elite network relationships between the 
world’s largest oil companies and concluded came to conclusion that there is an ongoing 
movement away from state control of the global oil market ‘in spite of greater influence for 
state-owned oil companies’. Also, ‘this development points to a broader contradictory dynamic: 
the renewed importance of the role of the state, and of ‘statist capital’, within an increasingly 
transnational, interdependent and interconnected global political economy’.  49 
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In 2008, the directors of the world’s top 10 private oil companies collectively managed almost 
1.6 trillion dollars in revenues, but during the same year only 7 countries’ GDP exceeded that 
amount.50  Four of these corporations are state owned, Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia), National 
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Petroleos de Venezuela SA (Venezuela),  PetroChina (China).  One 
is state controlled (Gazprom 23% state owned) and five are privately owned international oil 
companies (Exxon, Chevron (USA), Total (France), BP (UK), Royal Dutch Shell 
(Netherlands/UK)).  
 
Control over energy resources is an important strategic activity because most economies are 
heavily reliant on oil revenues.  Exploration, drilling, refining, transportation, and distribution of 
energy is also strategic and highly profitable.  Currently, some ‘70% of the world’s oil resources 
are managed by state-owned corporations, in countries like Venezuela, Mexico, Iran, and 
Norway’, which provides these countries with resources to fund national development 
programmes.  If those are pushed into privatisation through the adoption of TiSA and then 
corresponding WTO adjustments, that control will eventually be in the hands of TNCs with no 
public accountability. 
 
Peru is a lucrative area to exploit as it is the seventh-largest crude oil reserve holder in Central 
and South America, with 579 million barrels of proven reserves.  Petroperu is the largest oil 
company in the country and is state-owned but 49% was approved for privatisation in 
December 2013. An overhaul of the Talara refinery in northern Peru is expected to be financed 
privately, with the first injection of private capital in its 40-year history, and the government 
expects to complete the project in 2017. Petroperú ‘will borrow US$3.5bn to pay for the project, 
according to officials, allowing total oil output to rise to 95,000 barrels/day from the current 
65,000 b/d’.  51   
 
The extent of state control over the petroleum industry will be undermined by the TiSA clause 
‘national treatment obligations’ which will make governments treat other providers equal to its 
own state run enterprises.  Mexico now too moved to open its oil markets after 75 years of state 
resource ownership by Pemex (Petroleos Mexicanos) and is projected to become a strategic 
producer by 2025.  The resources at stake are vast: ‘an estimated 160bn barrels of oil 
equivalent, which includes potentially 55bn mostly in deep waters and about 60bn in shale’. 52 
The United States is the most interested in this expanded market. In 2012, U.S. exports to the 
countries in the Americas totalled 2.0 million barrels per day, more than three times higher than 
in 2006 when it totalled 0.6 million barrels per day, mainly to Mexico and Canada but 
increasingly more so to Brazil and Chile.   
 
The Americas region presents a vast market to explore and exploits and in 2012 already 
‘produced and consumed about 31% of the world's natural gas,  while accounting for 20% of 
global natural gas trade in both imports and exports’. 53 It ‘holds an abundance of existing 
proven reserves, as well as the promise of abundant resources of both oil and natural gas’. It 
already comprises a sizeable portion of the global markets in liquid fuels and natural gas, has 
attracted FDI in the sector, and as a ‘region has the potential for further expansion and 
development’.54   That will mean more privatisations, land and water grabs, environmental 
degradation, population displacement, and disruption of local economic complexes, especially 
local agriculture.  
 
TiSA is being negotiated in combination with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership ( TTIP) will make it states liable for any, and even potential, loss of profit. There are 
many examples of energy companies suing governments already and that will only increase. 
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In 2012, the Swedish energy company Vattenfall filed a request for arbitration to the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, after Germany’s decision to 
abandon nuclear power. The company is claiming €3.7 billion (£3.04 billion) in compensation. 55 
Ecuador would face bankruptcy if it complied with investor judgements against it, espcailly the 
World Bank arbitration tribunal award to the Occidental Petroleum Corporation which granted 
it damages of $1.77 billion (£1.06 billion) because its operating contract was cancelled.56 
In a move which many countries will be watching with interest, Quebec is being sued by the 
company, Lone Pine Resources Inc, for $250 million (£134 million) damages after it introduced 
a moratorium on fracking. 57  
 
Problems with privatisation 
There are many countries which have reported problems with energy supplies after 
privatisation and liberalisation of energy markets.  In Australia, there are a series of failures 
which date back for several years. 58  After privatisation, maintenance staff were reduced in 
Victoria, which resulted in frequent power cuts and delays in fixing them.   A more recent report 
commissioned by the Electrical Trades Union (ETU) shows that ‘privatisation in the electricity 
sector has been an expensive and dismal failure’. 59  The study looked at ‘20 years of electricity 
privatisation reform, including the outcomes of power sales in Victoria and South Australia’ and 
showed that ‘no benefits to consumers’ but instead large financial losses to the public’.  60 
Moreover, the amount of consumer complaints in states with privatised energy supply soared 
from 500 to more than 50,000 per year.  
 
In Brazil, privatisation of energy provision, ‘has placed hydro-electricity at the service of large 
transnational companies such as mining, metallurgy and supermarket conglomerates’.  They 
enjoy prices 10 times lower than households. This has resulted into a price increase for 
domestic households of over 400% in the last 10 years, even though 80% of Brazil’s energy is 
generated through hydro-electric power. 61 
 
Domestic regulations / necessity test 
The energy sector will be affected in several ways by the TiSA clauses that limit domestic 
regulations.  One of the biggest dangers, is the threat to environmental regulations.  The 
excavation and drilling for oil and gas supplies is frequently damaging to the environment.  
Current community challenges to the introduction of fracking, show the importance of local 
communities being able to use government environmental regulations and protections to 
safeguard the quality of environmental resources such as air quality, uncontaminated land and 
water.  If TNCs raise the question of whether environmental regulations are a ‘necessity’ and 
argue that their profits would be threatened by the implementation of existing regulation, then 
the power of local communities and governments to limit TNC activities will be eliminated.  The 
threat to government regulations can also be seen in the operation of local energy markets.  Will 
subsidies to low income groups and isolated communities be challenged by TNCs? 
 
Future proofing 
The ‘future proofing’ clause will be significant for governments, which want to be active in 
changing patterns of energy consumption.   Municipal authorities, in countries such as Germany, 
have played a lead role in supporting new forms of energy generation because of a lack of 
interest by many major energy suppliers.  If municipalities were unable to take on this 
innovative role, the scope for developing new forms of alternative energy consumption would 
be limited to what was considered profitable by TNCs.   
 
Several energy companies are actively involved in the lobbying for TiSA, which reflects their 
interests in dominating any future energy markets.  For governments that recognise the threats 
of climate change, developing alternative sources of energy is an important part of any strategy.  
The scope of the ‘future proofing’ clause means that any new forms  of energy will be subject to 
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competition rules even if it is not currently produced.  This clause raises the threat of future 
public policy decisions about energy consumption being taken away from governments, with 
TNC interests dominating. 
 
6. Municipal services 
 
The potential for TiSA to affect the scope and effectiveness of the municipal services sector is 
extensive.  Although the process of public sector reform has reduced the scope of municipalities 
in the provision of services, many still provide and are responsible for public services.  They 
also play an important role in the regulation and inspection of services – water, social care, 
health care, environmental health/ food. Some play a strategic role in economic development 
through the support for small /medium sized enterprises, training and business development.  
Other municipal roles are found in public employment services, social inclusion / social support 
systems, education and libraries.   
 
Standstill and ratchet 
Local / municipal authorities often have the responsibility for providing waste management 
services.  In recent decades, many municipalities have contracted/ outsourced these services 
but found that the quality and reliability of the services is poor.  In 1997, what has been called 
‘The Big Pong’ over Adelaide, Australian was caused by mis-management of the water and 
sewerage supply which had been contracted to a private company.  A government report 
written by ex-public employee found that the problem was caused by ‘lack of investment in 
infrastructure and failure of routine procedures following staff cuts had both contributed to the 
massive sewerage treatment failure’. 62  
 
As with water and energy services, municipalities have been re-municipalising waste 
management services.   For example, in the United States, in 2010, Sioux City ‘terminated its 
wastewater management contract with American Water 14 years early’. The company was 
accused of ‘failing to meet its responsibilities and obligations, including providing adequate 
staffing’. After just one year, the city ‘cut the cost of operating the wastewater treatment plant 
by a quarter, saving about $1.5 million a year compared to the cost of private operation’ (Ibid. 
4).  This would not be possible under TiSA.  
 
In Newfoundland municipalities are currently considering a public private partnership as a way 
of upgrading the waste treatment infrastructure.  This has been mandated by the federal 
government.  Municipalities which enter into a long term public-private partnership and then 
find that the quality of services and operations provided by the private provider is of poor 
quality, will not be able to take back control of these services under TiSA. 63 
 
In the case of Stockholm County, in 2011, it was able to respond to a continuing series of 
complaints about the standards of care in homes run by Carema.  A 90 year old woman died of 
starvation in a care home where she had been living for three years.64 As a result Stockholm City 
terminated its contract with Carema.65 More than 150 complaints were made about Carema to 
the National Board of Health and Welfare.66  
 
There are other examples of water, energy, public employment services and social care services, 
which were privatised but have been brought back into municipal control following 
unsatisfactory service quality.  The inability of municipal authorities, as well as other levels of 
government,  to respond to criticism of service delivery by retaking control over services, limits 
the scope of local democratic accountability.  TiSA would prevent municipalities was 
establishing a public monopolies or other forms of delivery considered un-competitive. 67  
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Domestic regulations / necessity test 
As well as providing services, municipal authorities have important responsibilities in 
controlling the planning system, in approving the use of land and the quality of the 
environment.   These responsibilities would be undermined by TiSA provisions because TNCs 
would argue that the regulations were restricting their scope to do business.  As the 
environmental damage done by TNCs is a source of pollution, EXAMPLE,  this would make 
municipal authorities unable to control the quality of the local environment.  Once again, TNC 
interests would dominate local environmental decisions.  This also limits the scope of local 
campaigns to influence the way in which land and resources are used, whether for the benefit of 
local communities or TNC corporate agendas.  
 
There are many environmental issues raised by the expansion of TNC retail companies.  
Walmart has already announced that it would use TiSA provisions to eliminate zoning 
restrictions near to its stores.68   Restrictions on municipal planning regulations would affect the 
ability of municipalities to determine the quality of local urban environment, whether in terms 
of noise, air quality, building design.  In some countries, the regulation and standards for social 
care are a responsibility of municipal authorities.  Again, this would be eliminated if TNC 
providers of care considered regulations were limiting their revenues.    
 
Future proofing 
The provisions of TiSA, particularly the ‘future proofing’ clause, will result in the undermining of 
local democratic processes, with an impact on the power of local, regional and national 
governments.  The ability of government at many different levels to identify new needs for 
public services and ways of meeting these needs, may draw on new technology or new 
approaches to service delivery.  It is a part of democratic society, that citizens can elect political 
parties which are committed to the introduction of new public services.  Examples of new public 
services include, new healthcare technologies, new technologies for the treatment of water, new 
forms of energy generation and digital services for local businesses.  Municipalities have been 
able to respond to the needs of their local population for over a century.  During this period, 
new services have been established and the allocation of municipal resources has changed over 
time.  If this scope for meeting the changing needs of local populations, then an important 
democratic process would be undermined.  Any new services will have to be delivered within a 
competitive environment, with TNCs determining the form of provision. 
 
As well as limiting the power of municipalities to introduce new public services, the ‘future 
proofing’ clause will also limit the ability of municipalities to regulate services and future 
environmental protection standards if they would limit companies/TNCs in their business 
operations.   
 
National treatment obligations 
The national treatment obligation clause requires countries within the TiSA to treat local 
companies, local government agencies, local not for profits and cooperatives in the same way as 
they would treat TNCs. 69  This will affect the scope of municipal authorities to set up and 
nurture local businesses, social enterprises and cooperatives to provide services to local people.  
The strength of these locally supported businesses is that they have grown from an 
understanding of the needs of local people.  For example, a community leisure centre, which has 
worked with locally disadvantaged groups, would have to compete with a TNC leisure services 
company.  Subsidised rates and other ways in which local communities are encouraged to take 
part would be undermined.  Municipal authorities, in many countries, have played a role in 
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reducing poverty by collaborating with other agencies on a not-for profit basis.  TNCs would 
only be interested if the activities generated profits.  
 
The ‘national treatment’ clause has implications for locally established ‘state owned 
enterprises’. There is a long history of municipalities playing a key role in local economic 
development.  This may be through the provision of infrastructure for businesses at subsidised 
rates or through the support of state owned enterprises.  This would be undermined by TiSA 
competition clauses.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 
TiSA raises fundamental questions about the future of public services and the scope of 
government at local, regional and national levels to control the future of public services as well 
as regulate to improve economic, social and environmental well-being.  TiSA  will also limit 
government’s power to address future public services needs through the use of technology and 
other developments, which do not currently exist.  Limiting the power of government to meet 
future needs, is a major restriction on the democratic process.  Citizens vote for governments in 
the hope that they will improve society.  If governments are unable to do this, the democratic 
process is undermined. 
 
TiSA will impact on the health and social care sector in terms of service provision, driven by 
profits.  There is already extensive evidence that the profit motive distorts the delivery of health 
care towards the search for company profits rather than meeting healthcare needs.  It will 
potentially affect the regulation of healthcare, which is important for ensuring the provision of 
high quality care as well as the regulation of health workers, which will also affect standards of 
healthcare as well as the quality of the working environment. 
 
TiSA’s impact on both the water and energy sector will terminate any future moves towards re-
municipalisation and the return of these utilities to public ownership.  Again, this will damage 
the democratic process.  Re-municipalisation of both water and energy services has been the 
result of local communities campaigning for public control over basic public services.  
 
TiSA’s impact on the capacity of government to regulate will also undermine the power of 
government to protect and improve the environment for the benefit of citizens rather than the 
pursuit of profit.  The impact of climate change requires strong government commitment to 
change the ways in which energy is generated and consumed.  TiSA will minimise the role that 
governments play in this transformation.  The interests of some of the major TNCs are opposed 
to addressing the results of climate change. 
 
TiSA will also impact on the establishment and maintenance of labour regulations.  This is 
already under attack in many countries.  TiSA will facilitate the process of reducing the rights of 
workers in general but specifically the rights of public sector workers.  If public services are to 
be driven by the profits of TNCs, there will be no recognition of the value that high quality public 
sector workers contribute to high quality public services.      
 
 
Yuliya Yurchenko and Jane Lethbridge 
June 2014 
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Appendix A: Healthcare services provision, cost, and efficiency in Australia, Canada, Chile, 
France, Peru, South Korea, UK, and USA.  
 Australia  Canada  Chile  France   Peru  South Korea UK US 
Healthcare 
providers70 
Medicare 
(and 
more), 
State   
Multiple 
private 
Medicare, 
State 
Multiple 
private 
SHI: 
Fonasa 
Isapre 
+ 
AUGE 
Assurance 
Maladie 
(state) 
Multiple 
private 
MINSA 
60% 
EsSalud 
30% 
9.3% 
private; 
+Police 
and 
Army 
 National 
Health 
Insurance 
Corporation 
via private 
providers 
State: 
NHS 
Multiple 
private 
(8%) 
Patchwork of 
public and 
private 
insurers and 
hospitals. 
State: 
Medicare and 
Medicaid  
Multiple 
private 
Type of 
ownership  
Mixed  Private  Private    Private  Mainly 
state, 
mixed  
Mixed  
Costs I (patient):  
- experienced cost 
related access 
problems 
16 13 NA 18 NA NA 4 43 (total; 63 
% uninsured 
and 27% 
insured),   
- spent $1000 or 
more out of 
pocket 
25 14 NA 7 NA NA 3 41 
- Serious 
problems paying 
or unable to pay 
the bill 
8 7 NA 13 NA NA 1 23 
 - skipped dental 
care due to cost in 
past 2 years 
29 21 NA 20 NA NA 6 33 
Costs II (state):  
Per capita 
government 
expenditure on 
health at average 
exchange rate 
(US$) 
4108.4 4021.6  606.7 
(2011) 
3608.7 198.7 926.7 3009.4 4126.1 
Total, per capita, 
USD PPP 
adjusted (2012) 
4068.2 4675.9 1606.1 4260.2 554.6 2321.4 3494.9 8895.1 
Private share  24.9% 
covered by 
prepaid 
plans 
(2011) 
56% out-
of-pocket 
as part of 
private 
43.4% 
covered by 
prepaid 
plans 
(2011) 
50.1% out-
of-pocket 
as part of 
private 
 59.7% 
covered by 
prepaid 
plans 
(2011) 
32.1% out-
of-pocket 
as part of 
private 
87% out-
of-pocket 
as part of 
private 
14% covered 
by prepaid 
plans (2011) 
79.1% out-of-
pocket as part 
of private 
18% 
covered 
by 
prepaid 
plans 
(2011) 
56.8% 
out-of-
pocket as 
part of 
private 
59.3% 
covered by 
prepaid plans 
(2011) 
20.7% out-of-
pocket as part 
of private 
Efficiency and 
quality of service: 
 
Same or next day 
appointments  
58 41 NA 58 NA NA 52 48 
 Waited 6 or more 
days for 
appointment  
14 33 NA 16 NA NA 16 26 
Easy getting after-
hours care 
without going to 
ER 
46 38 NA 36 NA NA 69 39 
Availability of 
after-hours care at 
practice 
81 36 NA 76 NA NA 95 35 
Used emergency 
department in past 
2 years 
22 41 NA 31 NA NA 27 39 (48 
uninsured) 
Can email 
practice with 
questions 
24 10 NA 9 NA NA 25 28 
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Have emailed 
practice in past 
two years 
9 2 NA 2 NA NA 13 6 
Patients can email 
practices with 
questions 
21 11 NA 39 NA NA 35 35 
Insurance did not 
cover as expected/ 
spent a lot of time 
on paperwork in 
past year (adult 
patients, 2013)71 
16 15 NA 23 NA NA 4 32 
Insurance 
coverage 
restrictions pose 
major time 
concern (Primary 
care physicians, 
2012)72 
11 23  20   10 54 
Overall views on 
healthcare system, 
2013 
 
Works well, only 
minor changes 
48 40  40   63 25 
Fundamental 
changes 
43 50  49   33 48 
Completely 
rebuild 
9 8  11   4 27 
Source: compiled based on data collected by American Health Association (2013), the Commonwealth Fund (2013), OECD data, and 
national healthcare services websites.  
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